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Lessons (Not Yet) Learned
Marilyn J. Darling, M.A., and Jillaine S. Smith, B.A., Signet Research & Consulting LLC

Introduction

Key Points

Despite a significant influx of charitable dollars
over the last 10 to 20 years, solutions to complex
social problems remain elusive (Anheier & Leat,
2006; Damon & Verducci, 2006; Eisenberg, 2004).
Philanthropy has been facing growing pressure to
account for its tax-free dollars; to demonstrate,
replicate and scale success; and to be transparent
about failed social investments (Tierney, 2007).
Learning from failures to improve future performance has become a priority not only for the
learning and evaluation community, but increasingly for programs and executive teams as well.

· Despite a significant influx of charitable dollars
over the last 10 to 20 years, solutions to complex
social problems remain elusive, while philanthropy
has been facing growing pressure to account for
its tax-free dollars; to demonstrate, replicate, and
scale success; and to be transparent about failed
social investments.

“Failure” is a loaded term. Some foundations
prefer to talk about “mistakes” or “disappointments” to make them safer to surface and discuss
internally, and to protect their reputation and
that of their nonprofit partners. Michael Schrage
(2010) observed that “our failure to define failure
can undermine our ability to learn from it.” It is
far easier to learn from partial failures or “underachievers” than from total disasters because
the causes are easier to discover and learn from.
For purposes of this article, we will use the word
“failure” to mean instances when results fall short
of expectations. A failure can be large and catastrophic, causing an unfortunate but inevitable
end to a large investment. More often it is small
and recoverable, especially when a foundation
and its nonprofit partners are good at learning
their lessons quickly and well – before small,
recoverable failures turn into catastrophic ones.
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· When foundations and their nonprofit partners
ignore a failure and move on, whether it is to
protect their own reputation or the reputations of
valued partners or simply because of the pressure
to keep going, it is too easy to toss out the baby
with the bathwater – to toss aside a good idea
and start over. This is a sign of failing to learn.
· Learning from failure requires the difficult task
of changing deeply rooted habits of thinking,
decision-making, and interacting. This is especially
true in the social sector, where there are many
competing and equally important priorities – from
providing needed community services and building organizational capacity to achieving systemic
change.
· What does it take to actually learn those lessons
and improve future performance? Reflecting on
failures and publishing “lessons learned” reports
are good first steps, but do not guarantee that
those lessons will translate into improved results.
· In this article, the authors explore in detail what it
looks like for a lesson to be truly learned, and offer
concrete recommendations about steps to take to
make sure that an important lesson, once identified, actually turns into a lesson learned.
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Sidebar 1: The True Cost of Failure
In an era of high demand and stretched resources, examining the true
cost – both direct and indirect – of not learning from failures becomes
critical.
During our research into learning through grantmaking (Darling, 2010),
we heard the following not uncommon failure story: A foundation relied
heavily on a handful of intermediaries for an important and innovative
community-change initiative. Several things went wrong, but perhaps
the most critical was that the CEO of one of the intermediaries
became ill and had to step down.
With no bench strength, the intermediary’s work stalled and tensions
rose between it and the foundation’s other partners. After two years
of disappointing results, the foundation pulled the plug on the entire
initiative and shifted resources to “safer,” more traditional programs.
What was the direct cost of this failed initiative? At the very least, the
communities served lost access to a service which, even though less
than successful in the eyes of the grantmaker, provided public good
to people who needed it. The foundation experienced an opportunity
cost – money and staff resources that could have been devoted to an
initiative that was producing greater impact.
Now consider potential indirect costs of this failed initiative:
Without understanding the causes of the failure, other potential
investors assume the innovative theory was flawed and withdraw
support from an otherwise promising approach.
• By starting from scratch with another intermediary, the fou dation
and its nonprofit partners forfeit the opportunity to grow a stronger
partnership by actually learning from the failure.
• The reputations of other grantees are damaged, even though they
performed well.
• The foundation’s reputation is damaged as community stakeholders
become distrustful of its – or even worse, any foundation’s – stated
commitment to follow-through.
• Social-sector culture and practices shift in nonproductive ways:
The foundation’s board tightens up its oversight, becoming a
micromanager of program decisions. Wanting to put the past behind
them and move on, foundation and nonprofit staffs become less
transparent and open about talking about emerging problems and
disappointing results.
To be sure, not all of these costs are likely to materialize as the
result of a single failed program. Fortunately, what foundations and
nonprofits mostly experience are “less than optimal” outcomes, not
abject failures. Unfortunately, too many organizations fail to grasp the
partial success and therefore lose the opportunity to build upon it.
Now consider the potential positive impact had the foundation and
its nonprofit partners learned how to learn from failures. If foundation
staff had used lessons garnered from past programs to recognize the
problem early, help the floundering intermediary pull through, and help
repair strained relationships, the program might have been saved. The
direct benefits might be that more members of the community would
have received an innovative service from a collaboration of committed,
aligned partners, and the foundation would have achieved at least a
portion of the impact promised by the investment. But beyond that,
the indirect benefits could include making future investments easier to
leverage through innovative grants, stronger partnerships with more
capable grantees, better decision-making, a board that understands
the landscape and has confidence in the foundation staff to navigate
it, and boatloads of goodwill in the community (Table 1).
In The Foundation, Fleishman (2007) cites as a counter-example the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s End of Life initiative, which was
a completely “failed” initiative from the 1990s. As described in Isaacs
and Colby (2009), the foundation learned from the experience and
conceived a much more holistic strategy to replace it. Ultimately, Bill
Moyers created a television documentary that led to a citizen-led
network of end-of-life groups in 20 cities and recognition of the issue
as a health care discipline.

98

It is the authors’ opinion that the process of learning from failure is not just the responsibility of
philanthropy. Given the complexity of working
with a network of partners to achieve an outcome,
the lessons to be learned don’t fit neatly within
organizational boundaries. The analysis and recommendations that follow can be viewed through
the lens of an individual organization – either a
grantmaker or a nonprofit, and used within those
organizations. But they will be of most value if
viewed through the lens of the larger social sector
– the entire network of foundation and nonprofit
partners that have committed to work together
toward a shared outcome.
When foundations and their nonprofit partners
ignore a failure and move on, whether to protect
their own reputation or the reputations of valued
partners or simply because of the pressure to keep
going, it is too easy to toss out the baby with the
bathwater – to toss aside a good idea and start
over. This is a sign of failing to learn. And it is a
waste of an investment. The ultimate result of
going from solution to solution without gaining
insight about what works when is that the same
lessons get learned over and over again. (See Sidebar 1: The True Cost of Failure.)
In their book, Money Well Spent, Paul Brest and
Hal Harvey (2008) name acknowledging and
learning from failure as one of the core tenets of
strategic philanthropy. Grantmakers for Effective Organizations (GEO) convened a group of
grantmakers to do peer learning around the topic,
facilitated by one of the authors. Joel Fleishman
devotes a whole chapter to failure in The Foundation, observing that:
It’s understandable that foundations should prefer
to trumpet their successes and ignore their failures.
… Yet acknowledging, analyzing, and understanding foundation failures could go a long way toward
strengthening foundation practices, improving their
success rates, and enabling the entire social sector
to learn what didn’t work so that flawed approaches
are not unwittingly repeated by others. Moreover,
owning up to failures would be a sign of foundation maturity and self-confidence, both of which are
undermined by covering up failures. (2007)

THE

FoundationReview

Lessons (Not Yet) Learned

TABLE 1 Potential Costs/Benefits Related to Failure and Learning To Learn From It

Potential costs of failure

Benefits of learning to learn from failure

Direct

Community: Lost access to services
Social sector: Opportunity cost

Community: Greater access to innovative services
Social sector: Demonstrated results

Indirect

Damage to potential innovative solution
Loss of valued partners
Community distrust
Greater board oversight
Reduced staff risk-taking and disclosure

Better decision-making
Stronger partnerships with more capable grantees
Board confidence
Staff confidence and transparency
Community goodwill

Easier said than done. Learning from failure requires the difficult task of changing deeply rooted
habits of thinking, decision-making, and ways of
interacting (Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, 2007). This is especially true in the social
sector, where there are many competing priorities
(Unwin, 2005) and where engaging in learning
activities might not be seen as mission-critical
by overcommitted foundation and nonprofit staff
members. Such staff face the conundrum of feeling pressure to produce impact while not having
time to hone their skills. James and Wooten assert
in their research that an essential capacity for
leading under pressure is the ability for an organization to learn (James & Wooten, 2009).

and reflect on them honestly (2010, p. 2). And
once that barrier is breached, the sector’s skill at
actually learning from those insights is in need of
development. “The learning crisis we face in the
nonprofit sector impedes our ability to be more
effective in reaching better outcomes for families
and communities” (Giloth & Austin, 2010, p. 2).

What does it take to actually learn those lessons
and improve future performance? Reflecting on
failures and publishing “lessons learned” reports
are good first steps, but alone do not guarantee
that those lessons will translate into improved
results. In this article, the authors explore in
detail what it looks like for a lesson to be truly
learned, and offer concrete recommendations
about steps to take to make sure that an important lesson, once identified, actually turns into a
lesson learned.

• The Annie E. Casey Foundation was an early
pioneer in sharing painful lessons. The Path of
Most Resistance addressed the disappointing
results of their New Futures initiative (Annie
E. Casey Foundation, 1995). More recently,
the foundation published “Philanthropy and
Mistakes: An Untapped Resource,” in which it
used the publication of three failures to make
the case for examining failures as a means to
improve results (Giloth & Gerwitz, 2009).
• In a 2003 reflection about the demise of
SeaChange, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation
admitted that the vision, intention, and conviction behind its $735,000 underwriting was not
matched with an equal measure of rigor, action,
and evidence (W. K. Kellogg Foundation, 2003).
• The James Irvine Foundation reported on its
attempts to correct its course and salvage a $60
million investment in after-school programs
gone wrong (Walker, 2007).
• The Carnegie Corp. admitted that a $200 million grant to Zimbabwe was “long on hope and
short on strategy” (Carnegie, 2007).

Publishing Lessons Learned Reports
About Failures
Historically, the social sector has proven itself to
be weak at looking honestly at failure and learning from it. In Mistakes to Success, Bob Giloth
of the Annie E. Casey Foundation and Colin
Austin of the nonprofit MDC Inc., make the case
that, while much can be learned from failures,
the social sector must first break through “the
propensity for ignoring and hiding, rather than
disclosing and reflecting on, failed approaches”

2011 Vol 3:1&2

To begin to turn the tide, some foundations have
taken the courageous step of publishing “lessons
learned” reports about failed programs. Leaders
in this effort include some of the largest grantmaking organizations, all of which have published
“lessons learned” reports or articles about important failures:
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Sidebar 2: Peeling the Onion
One “lessons learned” report from a foundation participant in a
collaborative cited partnerships with the public sector as both valuable
and challenging. Bureaucratic delays drained the budget and set
back the schedule. The collaborative remained committed to its work
with the public sector, but the collaborative’s director concluded that
working with a public partner requires “flexibility.”
For a “lessons learned” report to be useful, its authors have a
responsibility to fully articulate their lessons. “Flexibility” is a concept
that warrants a more careful definition. How will being flexible minimize
the impact on the budget and schedule? If the staff keeps this
question in mind, the resulting hypotheses may help them hone in and
test (and retest) their best thinking. Peeling back the onion in this way
will lead to better understanding of the sources and early indicators of
delay, which may then lead to such solutions as:
developing healthy relationships with key public partners so that
potential delays can be discovered early and mitigated;
•

ensuring a shared understanding of respective goals – sources of
alignment as well as where goals diverge, and how to manage that;
•

planning to deal with the likely transition of key individuals in the
collaboration; and
•

breaking through assumptions about what steps are essential and
where efficiencies might be found.
•

Continuing to ask, “What will it take to do that?” helps a community
to continue to flesh out its thinking until a more complete solution to a
vexing challenge is unveiled.

• In his courageous and much-publicized admission, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
President Paul Brest bared the grantmaker’s
inability to see much change from its 10-year,
$20 million investment in improving the lives
of residents (Brown & Feister, 2007).
• The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation dedicated an entire issue of its To Improve Health
and Healthcare series to its own lessons
learned from “programs that did not work out
as expected” (Isaacs & Colby, 2010, p. 5).
• Bill Gates has been remarkably candid in several interviews about his foundation’s frustration
with missteps in its quest to eradicate polio and
malaria through wide availability of vaccines
(Guth, 2010).

takes and benefit from the insights shared about
what caused those mistakes.

Why ‘Lessons Learned’ Aren’t
Unfortunately, merely publishing a “lessons
learned” report – regardless of how thorough
the analysis behind it – is no guarantee of future
success. This unrealistic expectation risks undermining the effort to build the learning habit.
It is especially frustrating to people who worked
hard on creating a “lessons learned” report about
a painful failure to review a grant report a year
or two later and feel a sense of déjà vu settle over
the room as familiar failures from familiar causes
present themselves.
Three factors contribute to the gap between a lesson learned and improved results:
1. In a complex environment, the first lesson is
usually incomplete, so simply implementing it
does not produce consistently better results.
2. The causes of failure often involve dilemmas or systemic tensions that are not easily
resolved by “do this” recommendations.
3. “Fixing” the identified causes of failure may
cause even greater failures in the future.
The First Lesson Is Usually Incomplete
Even the deepest of retrospective analyses of a
complex series of events is prone to a number of
errors. The people most able to understand causality may not have participated in the analysis.
A key piece of data or critical perspective may be
missing. The analysis may not dig deep enough
back into the chain of causes and, as a result, participants may land on “fixing” something that was
actually caused by a deeper and more pernicious
dynamic. The resulting solutions may be incomplete or not translatable to a slightly different
situation in the future (Darling, Parry, & Moore,
2005). For example:

Being deliberate about publishing “lessons
learned” reports helps communicate a foundation’s intention to be transparent and to not hold
itself up as the infallible expert. It also serves as a
potential source of wisdom to others in the sector.
By publishing reports of failures and the insights
• The failure of a health clinic to provide needed
they have gained, the hope is that other foundaservices to homeless women might be caused
tions and nonprofits will not make the same misby offices that are too well appointed for and
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intimidating to their intended clients.
• An early-education program might succeed
in providing new computers to an antiquated
school infrastructure, but children cannot gain
access because the school cannot afford the
staff to help them.
The process of truly learning a lesson is one of
peeling the onion until a more complete understanding and set of solutions is developed. (See
Sidebar 2: Peeling the Onion.)
Dilemmas and Systemic Tensions Are Not Easily
Resolved
“Lessons learned” reports often reveal inherent tensions that don’t lend themselves to facile
solutions. The choice is often not between right
and wrong, but between things that are right for
different reasons. A common tension faced by
programs that are aiming to scale a solution to a
larger population is between instituting common
metrics and respecting local variations. Common metrics make it easier for the funding entity
to learn across geographies, but may ultimately
increase the failure rate when local communities find their needs conflicting with the larger
initiative. This tension is at the heart of a dialogue
about the Promise Neighborhoods initiative
hosted by the Bridgespan Group and published
on its website. Commenters talk about the tradeoff between “political concerns” and “communitydriven planning”; between a “franchise model of
the world” and “the importance of local differences and the opportunities to harness creativity, self-organizing, and relationship building”
(Howard & Stone, 2009).
Solutions that succeed in the short term may fail
in the long term. In “Leveraging Grantmaking:
Understanding the Dynamics of Complex Social
Systems,” David Peter Stroh observes that “good
intentions are not sufficient to produce positive
outcomes. … Nonobvious system dynamics often
seduce us into doing what is expedient but ultimately ineffective” (2009, p. 121).
For example, a “lessons learned” report cites the
need to anticipate delays and cost overruns and
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proposes developing a budget with a cushion
to absorb them. But that conflicts with limited
resources and the pressure to be efficient. Because
extra time and budget always get used up, rather
than padding every project that might run over
budget, such a scenario begs the more complex
question: What will it take to be as efficient as
possible, in the face of anticipated delays and cost
overruns?

Even the deepest of retrospective
analyses of a complex series of events
is prone to a number of errors. The
process of truly learning a lesson is
one of peeling the onion until a more
complete understanding and set of
solutions is developed.
‘Fixing’ Failures Is Not the Same as Learning
From Them
A much too common approach to correcting
failures is to build institutional solutions to problems.1 Generally, building institutional solutions
to “lessons learned” is about creating safeguards
to mitigate the mistakes people have made in
the past (which assumes, by the way, that human
error was the true cause of failure). Saying “let’s
never do that again,” foundations are prone to creating large, process-heavy decision-making and
annual planning processes. The resulting procedures and checklists might reduce the opportunity to fail, but they also can reduce the opportunity
to learn – both for foundations and their grantees. They can reduce opportunities for grantees to
innovate and to respond to external realities. And
they take people away from their real work. These
often labor-intensive planning and decisionmaking processes become so burdensome that
staff members have less time to attend to what
We are referring here only to institutional solutions, not
to making course corrections in the middle of a program or
initiative, which we advocate.
1
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TABLE 2 A Logic Model for Lessons (Truly) Learned

What does it take to use ‘lessons learned’ to improve future performance?
Inputs
· Leadership
understanding of
and commitment
to learning from
failure; modeling
and rewarding new
behaviors

· Tools for
articulating thinking
(logic models, etc.)

· Time preserved for
reflection, especially
during planning

· Collaboration
platforms and
community
learning across

organizational
boundaries
· Real-time

evaluation tools and
effective evaluation
metrics

Activities
Foundation and
nonprofit partners:

Outputs
Foundation and
nonprofit partners:

· Identify high-priority · Are focused on
challenges and
commit to learning
about them

· Learn to build
alignment by
articulating thinking
(actions and
expected results)

· Study situations
and learn what
works when

· Develop the tools
and skills needed to
correct course:
- Learn to recognize
familiar patterns
(early indicators)
that indicate
potential pitfalls or
leverage points

learning about highpriority challenges
in order to improve
performance

· Are aligned around
shared goals and
metrics
See different
situations clearly:

· Demonstrated
results
Indirect:
· Better decisionmaking

· Stronger
partnerships with
more capable
partners

· Board confidence

- Predict and plan to
avoid or mitigate
likely pitfalls

goodwill

create a culture in
which problems can
be raised early and
talked about openly

· Develop skill at

· Recognize positive

reflecting on results
and take time
to draw on past
lessons from similar
programs and
situations to inform
planning

Impact
Direct:
· Community access
to promised services

- Choose the right
(and realistic) goals
and implement
plans for that
situation

- Recognize leverage
points where
innovation can
expand impact
and have the
confidence and
authority to try new
ideas

· Work together to

Outcome
A network of
partners working
together consistently
stays on course to
achieve or exceed
expected outcomes,
even in challenging
and unpredictable
situations

· Staff confidence
and transparency

· Community

or negative changes
and can correct
course quickly and
effectively

· Track results,
reflect on them, and
adjust thinking and
action

Two important notes:
1. This describes an ideal state. It would be impossible to consistently achieve this outcome 100 percent of the time, but it is not an
all-or-nothing outcome. Incremental improvement produces incremental value.
2. Like all logic models, it attempts to describe a very complex set of relationships and is probably inherently incomplete. The authors’
aspiration is to engage readers in taking a fresh look and to encourage a dialogue about the question.

happens after a grant decision is made, which,
we believe, ironically sets up a vicious cycle of
failures that result in more institutionalization on
the front end.2
2

This dynamic is an example of the “fixes that fail” arche-
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For these reasons, it is better to think of “lessons learned” as “lessons (not yet) learned.” In its
report, Evaluation in Philanthropy: Perspectives
type described in The Fifth Discipline (Senge, 2006).
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From the Field, Grantmakers for Effective Organizations (2009) described learning as “a continuous
process, a culture, and a commitment to support
the capacity of people to reflect on their work in
ways that help them see the paths that can lead to
ever-improving performance” (p. 5).
The ultimate goal of learning from experience,
either from failure or success, is to improve the
ability of an organization or a network to achieve
or exceed expected outcomes – even in challenging and unpredictable situations (James &
Wooten, 2010). To accomplish this, foundation
and nonprofit partners need to:
• build their ability to scan and understand a
situation;
• construct sound, realistic goals and strategies
and effective implementation plans that fit that
situation;
• predict challenges and have access to the right
tool kit to address them; and
• know when to adjust and know when to stop
something that has no chance of succeeding.
This is no small feat and is even more complex in
the social sector, where impact is possible only
through the coordinated actions of a number of
independent (and often independent-minded) entities. Table 2 proposes a logic model for “Lessons
(Truly) Learned” that recognizes the complex
environment in which foundations and nonprofit
partners seek to create outcomes.
An example from Isaacs and Colby’s anthology
beautifully illustrates the reality of learning in
complex environments. Community Programs for
Affordable Health Care was a 1980s program that
started with “an idealistic, sunny notion … that
community representatives holding very different vested interests would voluntarily put aside
their own needs and aspirations to find a solution
to a problem for the greater good.” In hindsight,
“probably the main lesson is that foundations
entering the rough-and-tumble world of local
politics should do so with their eyes wide open”
(2010, p. 2).
This is a good insight. It doesn’t overly prescribe
a solution, nor does it suggest that foundations
2011 Vol 3:1&2

can’t succeed. Instead, it suggests that the real lesson is not yet learned. By recognizing that there
are challenges to be anticipated and prepared
for, a community of actors can stay attuned to
changes in the situation and opportunities to try
out new ideas. Together, they can ask, “What will
it take to achieve our shared goal with community
representatives who hold very different vested
interests?”

The essence of building islands of
mastery is to identify a handful
of common sources of failure –
such as – unclear grantor-grantee
expectations, executive transitions
in intermediaries, truth-telling
to funding sources and/or senior
leaders , etc. – and then create an
extended campaign to transform
“lessons (not yet) learned” into
dependable building blocks of the
craft.
Using Lessons Learned to Improve Future
Performance
Much attention has been paid by thoughtful
practitioners to the inputs listed in Table 2 (Hubbard, 2005; York, 2005; Connolly & Lukas, 2002),
but not enough, in the authors’ opinions, to the
concrete activities and outputs that translate lessons into lessons learned. By not attending to the
middle steps of this path to learning, organizations can fall into the trap of measuring their skill
at learning based on the presence of these inputs.
Is the presence of these leadership actions, evaluation tools, collaboration platforms, etc., in fact
resulting in foundation and nonprofit partners
who can actually recognize pitfalls and leverage
points and adjust?
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TABLE 3 Before- and After-Action Reviews Help Articulate Thinking and Structure Learning During Implementation

•
•
•
•

What are our intended outcomes and
measures?
What challenges can we anticipate?
What have we and others learned from
similar situations?
What will make us successful this time?

After-Action Review (AAR) Questions
ACTION

Before-Action Review (BAR) Questions

Therefore, while the inputs listed in Table 2 are
important and valid contributions, we will focus
our discussion on five important activities:
1. identifying high-priority challenges and committing to learning about them,
2. building alignment by articulating thinking
(actions and expected results),
3. studying situations and learning what works
when,
4. developing the tools and skills needed to correct course, and
5. developing skill at reflecting on results and
using those insights to inform future planning.
Identify High-Priority Challenges and Commit to
Learning About Them
Foundations and nonprofits often make the mistake of thinking that they need to harvest every
possible lesson from a failed program and address
everything at once. In complex work, there are
simply too much data and too much to learn. As
with success, it is important to focus strategy on
a few essential elements in order to learn. Mary
Williams of Lumina Foundation observes:
One of the challenges is that there’s too much to
learn. If you try to learn everything, you’re going to
drown. We want to learn from every grant, every
program, every event. It’s too much. The biggest
challenge is to figure out what the most strategic
things to be learned are and letting go of the rest of it
(Darling, 2010).

Honing in on a priority challenge helps foundation and nonprofit partners learn the craft of
104

•

What were our intended outcomes?

•
•
•

What were our actual results?
What caused our results?
What did we learn? (How will we adjust our
thinking and actions for next time?)

learning by making visible progress in one area
and then seeing how it may be applied to other
challenges and opportunities. We refer to this as
building “islands of mastery.”
The essence of building islands of mastery is to
identify a handful of common sources of failure –
such as – unclear grantor-grantee expectations,
executive transitions in intermediaries, truthtelling to funding sources and/or senior leaders,
etc. – and then create an extended campaign to
transform “lessons (not yet) learned” into dependable building blocks of the craft.
For example, the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation recognized that the lack of organizational
skills among its key grantees was the weak link
in their collective effort to make progress toward
their goals. By concentrating on strengthening
the foundation’s skill at providing organizational
development assistance to its grantees, the foundation developed a level of mastery over a few
years that allowed it to focus on the next hurdle,
confident that it could get grantees up to a level
of organizational skill that would make it possible
for them to succeed (Darling, 2010).
Build Alignment by Articulating Thinking (Actions
and Expected Results)
In its report, “Essentials of Foundation Strategy,”
the Center for Effective Philanthropy (CEP)
makes the case that “foundation leaders’ conceptions of strategy overvalue the presence of a strategic plan and undervalue the logical connections
necessary to have a strategy” (Buteau, Buchanan,
& Brock, 2009, p. 5). CEP argues that leaders who
are strategic “continually test the logic underlying
existing strategies for achieving their goals” (Buteau et al., 2009, p 10). This insight is not only relevant to strategic planning. In order to learn, it is
essential to become good at articulating thinking,
THE
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FIGURE 1 A Formula for Growing a Network’s Capacity to Achieve Outcomes
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especially when workingFigure	
  
across
After-Action
Reviews,
a tool that helps groups
boundaries, in order to build true alignment and
articulate their thinking during implementation.)
to test and refine theory in practice.
Study Situations and Learn What Works When
Logic models, theory of change and evaluation
So many of the lessons reported in “lessons
frameworks are powerful tools to surface thinklearned” reports are about the environmental facing. But as one of the authors reported in a recent tors that caused failure:
research report, if it becomes a “once-every-fiveyears-whether-we-like-it-or-not process,” it can
• different levels of resource availability, combecome overly burdensome. It risks becoming
munity engagement, local leadership, etc. in
an artifact, not often or easily revised (Darling,
different regions;
2010).
• changing market forces that affect replication
success over time and geography;
Every decision and action is implicitly or explic• the role of politics and special interests in proitly a hypothesis: If we make (this) decision or
gram outcomes;
take (this) action, then we expect (that) result.
• perceptions by Third World countries of soluFor example: If we ask women in the community
tions proffered by Western foundations and
to help design health clinics that will be comnonprofits.
fortable, safe, and unintimidating, then we will
increase clinic use by the population we aim to
For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundaserve.
tion convened a conference of grantees working with the foundation on polio vaccines. One
The process of articulating thinking should not
insight from the conference, as reported in The
be the province of initiative planning only, but
New York Times, was that “poor countries lacking
should also be used throughout implementation
regulatory authorities and highly educated politi(Woodwell, 2005). When assumptions behind
cal and scientific elites may be nervous about
decisions and planned actions are made explicit,
being misused by Western scientists and carethe community of partners can better test their
ful about accepting new technologies” (McNeil,
thinking and even extend it in innovative ways.
2010). The question this raises going forward:
The second (“then”) half of the hypothesis also
What will it take to raise the level of confidence
proposes, at least directionally, how to measure
among local political and community leaders in
effectiveness (e.g., an increase in clinic use by the
poor countries?
targeted population). (See Table 3, Before- and

2011 Vol 3:1&2

105

Darling and Smith

Certainly some initiatives fail for reasons that
the partners involved could neither predict nor
control. But to write off a failure due to “variables
outside of our control” potentially misses a powerful lesson about predicting and managing the
environment in which social change happens.

In the authors’ research on learning
through grantmaking, we looked
at the strength of the link among
planning, action, data gathering,
reflection, and back to planning.
We consistently found that the link
between reflection and planning was
weak if not broken.
Bob Hughes, former chief learning officer for the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, highlights the
need to go beyond assessing and learning about
program work to assessing and learning about the
environment in which that work is carried out:
Environmental assessment begins with the environment in which a foundation operates; it starts with
the context from which the goals and strategies are
developed and within which they are carried out. It
is at heart an external orientation, looking outside
the boundaries of a foundation and its programs.
(Hughes, 2010, p. 6)

how well it understands the politics, natural resources, sources of economic stability and stress,
and sense of cohesion in each of the communities
they aim to support.
Develop the Tools and Skills Needed to Correct
Course
Failures can be big and fatal – destroying programs, promising ideas, and critical relationships
– or they can be small and recoverable. In their
insightful article, “Failing to Learn and Learning
to Fail (Intelligently),” Mark Cannon and Amy
Edmonson (2006) make the case that:
An intelligent process of organizational learning
from failure requires proactively identifying and
learning from small failures. Small failures are often
overlooked because at the time they occur they appear to be insignificant minor mistakes or isolated
anomalies, and thus organizations fail to make timely
use of these important learning opportunities. We
find that when small failures are not widely identified, discussed, and analyzed, it is very difficult for
larger failures to be prevented.

The ability to recognize familiar patterns – earlyindicators – that might seem mundane but that
indicate potential pitfalls or leverage points, is an
essential part of learning to improve performance,
as is working together to create a culture in which
problems can be raised early and talked about
openly.

The evaluation field has been experimenting with
new data-collection methods that give foundations and their partners feedback in faster cycles
during the course of a grant program, rather
The authors propose that “lessons (truly) learned” than depending on very slow-cycle post-mortem
require a combination of understanding the “tools evaluation reports. Michael Quinn Patton’s writof the trade” and how those tools work to achieve ings on utilization-focused evaluation have done
desired outcomes in a variety of situations (Holmuch to lead the field in this direction by insisting
land, 1995). This has important implications for
that relevant evaluation data should be available
scaling initiatives and replicating best practices.
in time to inform decisions, both for grantmakers
Situation must be a deliberate part of the learning and for grantees (2008).
formula. (See Figure 1.) For example, a foundation that aims to improve economic conditions in Some foundations have shifted from periodic
rural communities plans a series of community
grantee check-ins at prescribed times to the
meetings. The goal is to identify and enlist local
creation of inflection points designed to fit in a
partners to lead the effort in their communities.
meaningful way into the grantee’s actual work.
The foundation will succeed in measure based on These include just-in-time oral interviews or
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FIGURE 2 The Weak Link in "Lessons Learned"
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of committed partners.
closely with grantees to create data that will be of
value to the grantees in their own learning as well In the authors’ research on learning through
as to the foundation.3 Before- and After-Action
grantmaking, we looked at the strength of the link
Reviews are simple tools that can help foundation among planning, action, data gathering, reflecstaff and their partners to train their attention
tion, and back to planning. We consistently found
in order to reflect and adjust as they go (Table
that the link between reflection and planning was
3). This set of tools can be designed to be very
weak if not broken (Darling, 2010). (See Figure 2.)
thorough and rigorous, or used very quickly and
on the fly to remind partners about their thinking Foundation and nonprofit partners can strengthbefore they walk into an event and check results
en this link consciously by looking forward during
just as quickly afterward. This makes Before- and reflection to identify the next opportunity to test
After-Action Reviews very practical tools for busy out insights in action, and by building into the
foundation and nonprofit staff members (Darling planning process a “look back” at lessons from
et al., 2005).
experience.

Develop Skill at Reflecting on Results and Use
Those Insights to Inform Future Planning
For purposes of improving future results, reflection needs to:
1. produce the best quality of insight possible
from the experience,
2. help participants develop information that
will enable them to predict and prepare for
similar situations; and

The most useful lessons to take away from either
a failed or successful initiative are the ability to
make stronger decisions on the front end and
predict pitfalls or potential leverage points during
implementation in comparable situations. It is
important, therefore, to resist the temptation to
jump too quickly to talking about solutions.

3. link consciously to current and future work

The focus in reflection should be first on using
the experience to gain a better understanding of
the situation, and second on what lessons to take
away that would improve future decisions and
predictions:

American Evaluation Association, November 2009 national conference session, “Evaluation to Inform Learning
and Adaptation in Grantmaking Initiatives.”

• How did decisions made and actions taken
interact with that situation to affect the result?

3
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• If we could turn the clock back, what different
decisions would we have made and why?
• If we could turn the clock back, what early indicators might have been visible and what would
it have taken to actually see and use them to
improve the outcome?

Conclusion
In the largest sense, foundations take the bold
step of publishing “lessons learned” from failures
because of their aspiration to raise the quality of
thinking and practice across the whole social sector. We suggest that the insights thus shared be
thought of as “lessons (not yet) learned.” To improve the quality of learning and practice across
the sector, we must go beyond avoiding past mistakes and replicating solutions to a deeper inquiry
into what it will take to achieve the social change
we seek, in the wide variety of complex situations
we work in.
In Good to Great and the Social Sectors, Jim
Collins advocates that leaders “determine your
‘questions-to-statements’ ratio and try to double
it. Ask more questions and make fewer statements” (Collins, 2005).
We must improve our ability to ask the important
questions and engage the whole community in
exploring new ideas, testing them out, sharing
their experiences with their peers, then formulating new hypotheses, over and over, until the most
pernicious sources of failure are transformed into
building blocks of the craft that can become a
platform to solve other social problems.
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